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within the statute.39 It has been contended that the require-
ment of conviction is not feasible because; (1) the slayer may
have committed suicide before he could be convicted, and (2)
the statute is sometimes held not to apply to a conviction in a
court outside the state. 40
In conclusion, it is urged that, in the absence of a control-
ling statute, the application of the constructive trust doctrine
best serves to determine the rights of the parties. It is further
urged that the most equitable method of applying the construc-
tive trust doctrine consists in allowing the survivor to retain a
one-half interest for his life free of trust; putting the other half
in constructive trust for the heirs of the decedent, and allow-
ing the whole of the estate to descend to the heirs of the deced-
ent upon the death of the slayer. The most direct remedy would
be by legislation, preferably of the type enacted in Pennsylvania,
where the same result would be effected as enunciated directly
above.
ALBERT M. CHRISTOPHER
MORTGAGES - LIEN AND PRIORITY - REVIVAL OF JUNIOR
LIENS. - One of the more notable rarities within the field of pro-
perty law is the doctrine of the revival of a junior mortgage upon
subsequent reacquistion of the property by the mortgagor. The
ramifications are readily apparent when one considers the im-
portance of the revival of junior mortgages in connection with
examination of abstracts of title, let alone the rights of junior
mortgagees, or of subsequent purchasers from mortgagors who have
reacquired foreclosed property. A review of the divergent theo-
ries and attending aspects formulated through past decisions
will reveal a highly interesting state of affairs.
It is recognized that a purchaser at a foreclosure sale, or
at a sale authorized by a mortgage,' takes a title free of all junior
39. See note 27 supra. The Minnesota statute provides that no felonious killer
. shall inherit from such person Or receive any interest in the estate of the decedent,
or take by devise or bequest from him..., whereas the words "or otherwise" in the
North Dakota statute broaden the scope of those not entitled to take.
40. Harrison v. Moncravie, 264 Fed. 776 (8th Cir. 1920) (wife convicted of killing
husband in Kansas allowed to inherit his land in Oklahoma; Kansas statute not applied).
1. Scott v. Paisley, 271 U.S. 632 (1926) (statutory power of sale which required
no notice by "security" deed holder to subsequent purchaser was held constitutional);
Carrington v. Citizens Bank of Waynesboro, 140 Ga. 798, 80 S.E. 12 (1913) (deed
to secure payment of loan contained a power of sale); Grove & Fultz v. Loan Co., 17
N.D. 352, 116 N.W. 345 (1908) (foreclosure sale by advertisement under power of sale
in mortgage could not be set aside because mortgage was usurious); Reilly v. Phillips,
45 S.D. 604, 57 N.W. 780 (1894) (the court quotes 2 Perry, Trusts §602 saying,
"It is a universal rule that a power (of sale) inserted in a mortgage . . . is a power
coupled with an interest, it cannot be: revoked by any act of the . . . grantee of the
power...
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encumbrances on the property if the encumbrancers are prop-
erly notified of the action.2  But if a fraudulent or collusive intent
motivates the foreclosure sale, the junior lien is not removed, it
is advanced to a first lien,' or is merely subordinate to a purchase
money mortgage.4 The notable exception to the rule stated above
occurs where the mortagor is the "purchaser" at the foreclosure
sale under the senior mortgage. The majority of the courts hold
that reacquisition of the property is of no avail and that junior
encumbrances will reattachA However, the unanimity express-
ed by the courts as to result is not founded upon similar theoret-
ical aspects.
IMPLIED PAYMENT THEORY
In deciding that the mortgagor, 6 or a grantee who assumes
the mortgage 7 may not set up the title acquired at the fore-
closure sale as against the lienor, the courts, under the implied
payment theory, have taken the view that the mortagor was
bound by the covenants in the second mortgage. Furthermore,
in fairness he should not be allowed to profit from his own
2. E.g. Mechanics State Bank v. Kramer Service, 184 Miss. 895, 186 So. 644
(1939) (foreclosure invalid as to holder of junior trust deed who was not made a
party to foreclosure suit); Norfolk Building Ass'n v. Stem, 113 N.J. 385, 167 Atl. 32
(1933) (mortgagee made subsequent grantee party defendant due to interest in restrictive
covenant); Krick v. Zemel, 99 N.J. 191, 122 Atl. 739 (1923) (purchaser at foreclosure
sale under prior mortgage was superior to subsequent deed of easement to use for common
wall); Wiltsie, Mortgage Foreclosure §778 (5th ed. 1939).
3. Elkind v. Pinkerton, 294 Mass. 502, 2 N.E.2d 456 (1936) (second mortgagee
was entitled to have equity of redemption sold where mortgagor allowed first mortgagee
to foreclose so that daughter could purchase property free of second mortgage); Stiger v.
Mahone, 24 N.J.Eq. 426 (1874) (second mortgage was advanced to a first lien where
grantee who assumed both mortgages and contrived with grantor to have first mortgage
foreclosed and then purchased the property at a price equal to the first mortgage); cf.
Kennedy v. Borie, 166 Pa. 360, 31 Atl. 98 (1895) (court overruled demurrer by defendants
to bill by second mortgagee to have defendants' property subjected to lien of second
mortgage where assuming grantee had purchased property at foreclosure sale, induced by
grantor and grantee for the purpose of defeating lien of second mortgagee).
4. Federal Land Bank of Columbia v. Bank of Lenox, 192 Ga. 543, 16 S.E.2d
9, 17 (1941) "The foregoing rules . . . long settled in this State and recognized . . .
in other jurisdictions, that a mortgage or deed to land securing its purchase money, and
executed as part of the same transaction in which the purchaser acquires title, will exclude
or take precedence over any prior lien against the property .. ."
5. Martin v. Raleigh State Bank, 146 Miss. 1, 111 So. 448 (1927) (second trust
deed reattached where first trust deed foreclosed and mortgagor subsequently reacquired
property); Ayer v. Philadelphia & Boston Face Brick Co., 127 Mass. 57, 31 N.E. 717
(1892) (court allowed second mortgagee to foreclose on property reacquired by mortgagor
after foreclosure of first mortgage); Sandwich Manufacturing Co. v. Zellmer, 48 Minn.
408, 51 N.W. 379 (1892) (second mortgage was revived against wife and her grantee
where she joined in second mortgage and acquired property after foreclosure of first
mortgage). Contra: Murray v. Newsom, 111 Fla. 193, 149 So. 387 (1933) (second
mortgage did not revive when mortgagor reacquired property after foreclosure on first
mortgage); Zandri v. Tendler, 123 Conn. 117, 193 Atl. 598, (1937) (mortgagor was
not estopped by covenant of warranty in second mortgage from asserting his title against
the second mortgagee).
6. Ibid.
7. Beitel v. Dobbin, 44 S.W. 299 (Tex. Civ. App. 1898) (second mortgagee
superior to assuming grantee who purchased at sale under first mortgage); cf. Kerr v.
Erickson, 24 S.W.2d 21 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930) (second mortgage revived where grantee
assumed prior mortgage and gave second mortgage for purchase price and subsequently
acquired property after foreclosure by first mortgage).
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wrong, which was his failure to pay the first mortgage and
his subsequent purchase of the mortgaged property free and
clear of the junior lien.' In conclusion, the courts will treat his pur-
chase of the foreclosed property as delayed payment of a ma-
tured senior. lien, nothing more.9 This doctrine has not been
applied where the mortgaged property was purchased at the
foreclosure sale by a third party and subsequently sold to the
mortgagor. In this instance, the courts conclude that the second
lien ceases to exist since the foreclosure sale is treated as a sale
of an entirely distinct title to the third party."0
The implied payment theory has been disfavored in recent
years, as typified by the criticism raised in jester v. Bickers."
In this case the mortgagor purchased at the foreclosure sale.
The court stated that the remedy afforded the junior lienor is
his right to bid at the sale of the property foreclosed by the
senior lien. Failure to do so extinguishes his rights in the pro-
perty.
WARRANTY TO DEFEND TITLE THEORY
In applying this theory the mortgagor is estopped to assert
his title, reacquired after the foreclosure sale, against the junior
lienor because the mortgagor warranted that he would defend
the title to the premises against all lawful claims and therefore
agreed to defend it against the first mortgage.' 2 But does the
warranty to defend title theory apply where a provision in the
second mortgage, contained within the covenant against encumb-
rances, specifically exempts the senior mortgage? The decisions
8. See note 3 supra.
9. Hilton v. Bissil, 1 Sandford Ch. 407 (N.Y. 1844), where the court states: "In
effect, the defendant used the money which he was bound to apply to the payment . . .
(second) mortgage for the purpose of buying the land under that mortgage. And instead
of leaving the premises subject to the . . . (second) mortgage as the first lien, which
would have been the effect of an honest application of his money.. . ."; ,3 Jones,
Mortgages §1887, (7th ed. 1915), "But if the mortgagor has given a subsequent mortgage
upon the same property, his purchase will not defeat this . . . he can not set up the
title acquired by such last purchase as against the junior mortgage, but his purchase will
be considered a payment of the prior mortgage."
10. Commercial-Germania Trust & Savings Bank v. Russell, 148 La. 334, 86 So.
831 (1920), court states: "From that moment (the foreclosure sale) this (second)
mortgage ceased to exist, and thereafter had no more existence than if having never
existed."
11. 72 S.W.2d 1103 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934).
12. Merchants National Bank v; Miller, 59 N.D. 273, 278, 229 N.W. 357, 359
(1930) "While the mortgagor did not warrant the land free from incumbrances, never-
theless he agreed with the plaintiff that he would defend his title to the premises against
all lawful claims, and therefore he agreed to defend it against the first mortgage."; Baird
v. Chamberlain, 60 N.D. 784, 236 N.W. 724 (1931) (second mortgage revived when
mortgagor re-purchased property after foreclosure and after mortgagor went through
bankruptcy).
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are in conflict. In Bricker v. Bricker,13 an Ohio case, the court
held that the act of excepting the prior mortgage manifested an
intent not to defend the title against the first mortgage. An
opposite view is enunciated in the North Dakota case of Mer-
chants National Bank v. Miller,14 which exemplifies the more
logical result,"5 since the covenant of warranty to defend title is
not of the same nature and import as the covenant against en-
cumbrances.16 Therefore the former covenant is in no way dero-
gated by the limitations expressed within the latter covenant."7
Irrespective of the views adopted in evaluating the relation
of the covenant of warranty to defend title to the warranty against
encumbrances, the fact still remains that invariably the second
mortgagee realizes that he is receiving a second mortgage and
expects it to remain a junior lien. It has been argued that if,
in applying the doctrine of estoppel, under the covenant of war-
ranty to defend title theory; the second mortgagee becomes the
senior encumbrancer, he is thereby unjustly enriched beyond
his own expectations. 6 The answer to this contention has been
that it is reasonable to assume that the second mortgagee ex-
tended capital in reliance on the idea that the prior encum-
brance would be removed before default.19
CONTRACTUAL SECURITY THEORY
The contractual security theory is considered the soundest
because the judicial reasoning effectuates the agreement and
13. 11 Ohio St. 240 (1860) "It is obvious from the nature and extent of the
covenant of warranty, it would include incumbrances . . . but . . . where there is a
special provision . . . or a qualified covenant in relation to incumbrances, the same
being part of the deed, the whole must be taken together, and so construed as to give
the entire instrument effect in all its provisions, and to make it consistant."; 1 Jones,
Mortgages §679, (6th ed. 1904).
14. 59 N.D. 273, 229 N.W. 357 (1930).
15. Sandwich Manufacturing Co. v. Zellmer, 48 Minn. 408, 51 N.W. 379, 381 (1892)
... the better opinion . . . is that the covenant of warranty is not limited by the
preceding restricted covenant against incumbrances."
16. Sommers v.. Wagner, 21 N.D. 531, 536, 131 N.W. 797, 798 (1911) "A
covenant against encumbrances and a covenant of warranty . . . are separate and inde-
pendent covenants of different import, and directed to different objects, and there is
no presumption that language qualifying one . . . was intended . . . or included in the
other. The exception of the mortgage from the covenant against encumbrances does not
thereby except such mortgage from the covenant of warranty in the deed."
17. See note 15 supra.
18. White, Revival of Mortgages, 10 Cin. L. Rev. 217, 242 (1936), in which the
author states: ". . . since (mortgagee) practically always knows that his mortgage is a
junior lien, and he expects it to remain such. To move him into first place is to give
him an unexpected 'windfall'."
19. Ayer v. Philadelphia & Boston Face Brick Co., 157 Mass, 57, 31 N.E. 717, 718
(1892) "... the present instrument is a mortgage, and it may be thought natural that
a debtor should covenant to keep his security good against paramount liens."
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intention of the parties. 20  In essence it is this: in executing
the covenant of warranty contained within the second mortgage.
the mortgagor has pledged the property as security for the debt.
Although the foreclosure of the senior mortgage prevents the
mortgagor from producing the security, the contract obligation
is not terminated. It is merely postponed until the mortgagor
can fulfill it. This subsequent ability to perform is created
through reacquisition of the foreclosed property.
INCIDENTAL APPLICATION OF THE REVIVAL THEORY
While it is recognized that a purchase money mortgage ne-
gotiated after foreclosure by the reacquiring mortgagor is given
priority over the revived junior lien,'2 t the same preference is
not accorded all purchase money mortgages created before fore-
closure. Oftentimes the grantee of the mortgagor, in purchasing
the land, will "assume" the sole existing encumbrance and will
give a purchase money mortgage, which constitutes a junior lien.
If the grantee should reacquire the land after foreclosure, the
purchase money mortgage will reattach under the revival theory.
An opposite result is declared where the grantee purchases "sub-
ject to" the existing mortgage.2 ' The distinction is that in the
latter case there is no duty imposed upon the grantee to pay
the first mortgage. It is also noteworthy that a second mortgage
will revive against the co-signor of said second mortgage, if and
when, he acquires the property.24  There has evolved a decided
split of authority in determining whether unsatisfied tax liens
revive when the delinquent owner reacquires the property from
20. Federal Land Bank of Columbia v. Bank of Lenox, 192 Ga. 54.3, 16 S.E.2d
9 (1941) (second mortgage revived when mortgagor repurchased property sold
tnder prior security deed); Jensen v, Duke, 71 Cal.App. 210, 234 Pac. 876 (1925)
.. . she again acquired title . . . and the title thus acquired, inures to the mortgagee
as security for the debt in like manner as if acquired before the execution . . . of the
mortgage"; cf. Barberi v. Rothchild, 7 Cal. 5.37, 61 P.2d 760 (1936) (grantor gave two
trust deeds and property sold under first trust deed, then grantor repurchased property
after bankruptcy; court said grantor held for benefit of one holding under second trust
deed); Note, Ind. L.J. 429, 4.34 (1936).
21. See note 4 supra.
22. See note 7 supra.
23. Slaughter v. Morris, 291 S.W. 961, 963 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926)"...
the rule that a purchaser of property incumbered with a mortgage or deed of
trust lien is estopped to deny the validity of such instrument applies only where
the instrument assumed is described in the deed of conveyance, and the assumption or
agreement to assume is made in the nature of a contract and for a valuable consideration."
24. Martin v. Yager, 30 N.D. 577, 582, 153 N.W. 286, 287 (1915) "In the
mortgage before us the wife not merely agreed to pay the debt . .., but she made
express covenants of quite enjoyment .... We can see no reason why in a court of
cqlnity . . . these covenants should not be held to be binding."
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a purchaser at the tax sale.' 5 But it would seem consonant with
a sound tax program to afford the state the remedies given to the
individual under the revival theory. 6
GENERAL OBJECTIONS TO REVIVAL THEORY
The soundest objection to the revival of the junior lien theory
is its contrariety to the modem theory of foreclosure. Under
a modern foreclosure sale all incidents of title possessed by the
mortgagor, mortgagee, and all other persons who are properly
notified of the foreclosure proceedings, are transferred to the
purchaser. -7  In purchasing at a foreclosure sale, the buyer fully
anticipates that he will be able to convey a clear title to anyone
who may purchase. Accordingly his market is necessarily lim-
ited if he cannot convey a clear title to the mortgagor, for there
is a possibility that in the future the mortgagor will be actively
seeking the property.- The revival theory also conflicts with
the general rule that a mortgage debt is extinguished upon expi-
ration of the period of redemption, which initially commenced
with the foreclosure of the senior mortgage. In compliance with
the above stated rule, the reacquistion of the property by the
mortgagor should be considered as a purchase rather than re-
payment of the debt .29
REVIVAL THEORY IN NORTH DAKOTA
Merchants National Bank v. Miller 3 has established the
precedent which has steadfastly remained the law in North Da-
25. McDonald v. Duckworth, 197 Okla. 576, 173 P.2d 436, 439 (1946) "When
state has sold the property to a bona fide purchaser in good faith, without collusion, nor
as the agent of the person obligated to pay the tax, a deed executed in pursuance thereof
transfers a full and complete fee simple title to the purchaser. Such purchaser may there-
after convey full and complete merchantablr, title to anyone, including the former owner.
except that such title would inure to the benefit of such third parties such as mortgagees
. . . and such other persons to whom the original obligor owed a personal obligation to
pay or protect." Contra: State v. Marhurger, 353 Mo. 187, 182 S.W.2d 163, 166 (1944)
* . . payment of taxes through purchase by the owner at the tax sale, or payment through
redemption by the owner, should relieve the title of the property of the lien affecting
it to the extent the paymnt discharged the obligation."
26. For logical discussion of the problem, combined with a criticism ot McDonald
v. Duckworth, note 25, supra, see 60 HarV. L. Rev, 658 (1947).
27. Ferguson v. Cloon, 89 Kan. 294, 131 Pac. 145 (1913) (plaintiff was divested
of all interest as mortgagee and as holder of reversionary interest); Hart v. Beardsley,
67 Neb. 145, 93 N.W. 423, 424 (1903) "An execution sale still vests in the purchaser
the actual interest of the execution defendant in the property sold; and a foreclosure sale,
in. the absence of an 5 reservation in the decree, still transfers to the purchaser every right,
title and interest of all the parties to the suit."; cf. Licking v. Hays Lumber Co., 146
Neb. 240, 19 N.W.2d 148 (1945) (state lien for taxes held a lien on land purchased at-
tax sale since state not made a party to the foreclosure proceeding).
28. See 13 St. John's L.Rev. 182 (1938).
29. Zandri v. Tendler, 123 Conn. 117, 193 At. 598, 602 (1937) "The foreclosure-
of the first mortgage, no deficiency judgment being sought, followed by the cutting off
of the rights of redemption of. the defendants by the expiration of the law days fixed for
them without action upon their part, extinguished the mortgage debt."
30. See note 14 supra.
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kota. The facts of the Miller case were as follows: Miller, pos-
sessing a half interest in the land in question, gave the plaintiff
a second mortgage upon his land. The first mortgage was as-
signed to Miller's father who subsequently foreclosed it. No re-
demption was made and the father received a sheriff's deed.
Miller, proceeding through bankruptcy, listed in his schedule
the indebtedness to the plaintiff. It was assumed, by the trial
court, that a discharge was decreed. Thereafter Miller organized
a "one-man corporation". The father sold the land to Miller,
giving a deed with the grantee's name omitted. This omission
was filled with the name of the corporation. In the action to
foreclose the mortgage, both Miller and the corporation were
parties defendant. Miller defaulted, and the corporation ap-
pealed from an adverse ruling in the trial court.
The Supreme Court held that the appellant corporation was
estopped to assert a purchase of property reacquired by the mort-
gagor, since the purchaser was charged with constructive notice
of the recorded unsatisfied mortgage. Furthermore the result
was supported by an after-acquired property statute,3' which the
court deemed applicable to reacquistion by the mortgagor as well
as to instances where the mortgagor possessed no title but later
acquired it. The appellant's contention that the discharge in
bankruptcy removed any liability based upon covenants within
the mortgage was rejected. In answer, the court declared that a
covenant of warranty to defend title is independent of a cove-
nant against encumbrances. No restriction was imposed upon the
covenant of warranty to defend title and the subsequent dis-
charge in bankruptcy did not prejudice the obligation imposed
under the covenant.
An interesting sidelight has. evolved from the Court's re-
marks in considering the discharge in bankruptcy aspect of the
case. The decision stated:
"Even if by the listing of provable claims under "the
broken covenants (within the bankruptcy schedule) he could
relieve himself from money judgment thereon, this does not.
affect his warranty of title so long as he has title either be-
fore or after the warranty is broken."
This writer believes that a permissible inference could be
drawn from the application of estoppel to defeat the discharge
31. N.D. Rev. Code §35-0206 (1943): "Title acquired by the mortgagor subsequent
to the execution of the mortgage inures to the mortgagee as security for the debt in like
manner as if acquired before execution."
NOTES
in bankruptcy to a similar application of estoppel to bar the
plea of statute of limitations. 2
CONCLUSION
The existence of the rule that a second mortgage automat-
ically revives against a reacquiring mortgagor, 3 and a bona
fide purchaser from said mortgagor,34 has created a problem of
utmost importance to the title examiner. The solution cannot
be attained through a quiet title action seeking to clear the title
of unsatisfied liens. Nor will equity cancel a real estate mort-
gage, which secures a valid unpaid debt, at the suit of the mort-
gagor, or a bona fide purchaser, a when the only basis for the
action is that the statute of limitations has run.36 It is therefore
imperative that the title examiner first ascertain whether the
unsatisfied junior mortgage, under a foreclosed prior lien, con-
tained a general exception to all covenants of prior lien, in
which case there is no problem of revival." Secondly, whether
the mortgagor, 8 a purchaser who assumed the mortgage,39 the
wife, or any other person who may have joined in the mortgage,40
has ever reacquired the property. The revival of the junior mort-
gage usually operates even when personal liability for breach
32. Howell v. Dowling, 52 Cal. App. 487, 126 P.2d 630, 635 (1942) "There -s
no doubt that except for the fact that the . . . (second) deed of trustee was fraudulently
procured, it would have reattached to the property when it was reacquired by the . . .
(mortgagor) . . . And this would be true regardless of the running of the statute of
limitations. . But see Cole v. Raymond 75 Mass. 217, 219 (1857) "A covenant of
warranty . . . runs w.th the land . . . it is also a personal covenant; and. if a breach
occurs . . . an action will be against him to recover damages . . . it must be treated in
all respects as a personal obligation; the usual incidents to the conduct of a personal
action will be applied."; 4 Tiffany, Real Property §1022, (3rd ed. 1939).
33. See note 5 supra.
34. Jensen v. Duke, 71 Cal. App. 210, 234 Pac. 876 (1925) (court allowed second
mortgagee to foreclose on property in the hands of mortgagor's grantee where mortgagor
had reacquired property after foreclosure of prior trust deed); Ayer v. Philadelphia &
Boston Face Brick Co., 159 Mass. 84, 34 N.E. 177 (1893) (purchaser without notice of
second mortgage takes no better title than mortgagor had); 52 Harv. L. Rev. 1177
(1939).
35. Ibid.
36. National Tailoring Co. v. Scott, 65 Wyo. 64, 196 P.2d 387 (1948) (court
refused to quiet title to property where mortgage was barred by the statute of limitations
but held that statute of limitations had no application to power of sale in the mortgage);
Booth v. Hoskins, 75 Cal. 271, 17 Pac. 225, 227 (1888) "Common honesty requires a
debtor to pay his just debts, if he is able to do so, and the courts, when called upon,
always enforce such payments if they can. The fact that a debt is barred by the statute
of limitations in no way releases the debtor from his moral obligation to pay it."; Tracy
v. Wheeler & Scott, 15 N.D. 248, 107 N.W. 68 (1906). Contra: Burroughs v. Burroughs
196 Okla. 50, 162 P.2d 549 (1945).
37. Midland Realty Co. of Minnesota v. Halverson, 101 Mont. 49, 52 P.2d 159
(1935) (second mortgage did not revive where covenant of warranty in second mortgage
did not warrant against first mortgage); Huzzey v. Hefferman, 143 Mass. 232, 9 N.E. 570
(1887) (second mortgage held not to revive where second mortgage contained a covenant
to "warrant and defend the premises against the lawful claims and demands of all persons
except those claiming under the prior mortgage"); 1 Jones, Mortgagors §679 (6th ed. 1904).
38. See note 5 supra.
39. See note 7 supra.
40. See note 24 supra.
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of covenant is at an end. This in effect imposes a permanent in-
capacity to hold title against the covenantee 41 and his assigns. 2
A situation approaching the impossible in detection arises
where the wife of a mortgagor joins in the second mortgage.
Later the first mortgage is foreclosed and the wife subsequently
changes her name through divorce or re-marriage and then re-
acquires the property. The Miller case implies that the unsatis-
fied recorded junior mortgage would be constructive notice to
subsequent purchasers from the wife.
Since North Dakota has unequivocally adopted the theory
of revival of mortgages, the only possible solution is to except
the prior mortgage specifically and distinctly from the covenants
of warranty in the second mortage.43 Although only a few cases
have been litigated on this point, the possibility exists that a
grantee in the chain of title may be one against whom the un-
satisfied second mortgage may revive. It is incumbent that every
precaution be taken in the examination of the abstract to protect
the client against such a contingency.
JOHN G. MUTSCHLER
TRUSTS. - IMPLIED TRUSTS IN NORTH DAKOTA. - An implied
trust is a trust created by operation of law I as distinguished from
an express trust which is created by words or conduct of the
settlor.'-' Into a single section 3 of the North Dakota Code
are concentrated all the methods of creating implied trusts. Sec-
tion 59-0106 of the code provides:
"An implied trust arises in the following cases:
1. One who wrongfully detains a thing is an implied
trustee thereof for the benefit of the owner.
2. One who gains a thing by fraud, accident, mistake, un-
due influence, the violation of a trust, or other wrongful act, is,
unless he has some other and better right thereto, an implied
trustee of the thing gained for the benefit of the person who
would otherwise have had it;
3. Each one to whom property is transferred in vio-
41. Merchants National Bank v. Miller, 59 N.D. 273, 285, 229 N.W. 357, 362
(1930) "... he is estopped from claiming (discharge in bankruptcy), so far as subsequent
title to the property is concerned, that the property is not affected by his solemn warranty.
He is simply not heard on that proposition. If he has any bad motive in mind to relieve
himself from any agreements which he is estopped from asserting, it would be better for
him to say farewell to the land and never again acquire an interest therein."; 52 Harv.
L. Rev. 1177 (1939).
42. Patton, Titles §125 (1938).
43. See illustrated examples note 37, supra.
1. N.D. Rev. Code §59-0105 (1943).
2. N.D. Rev. Code }59-0104 (1943).
3. N.D. Rev. Code 159-0106 (1943).
